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Daniel Blinka 
ast June 1993 the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals. 1 The 
Court's decision concerns the 
evidentiary standards govern-
ing the admissibi li ty of expert 
scientific evidence. Daubert changed the 
law in the Seventh Circuit and raises 
serious questions about the test presently 
applied in Wisconsin state courts. 
Daubert touches potentially the entire 
spectrum of expert evidence. Civil litiga-
tion and, to a lesser extent, criminal trials 
frequently feature one or more experts 
testifying on a variety of topics, often in 
opposition to one another. Credit or 
blame for the flowering of expert testi-
mony often is attributed to the Federal 
Rules ofEvidence (FRE), which has been 
adopted in varying forms in nearly 40 
states, including Wisconsin, over the last 
20 years. 
The use of expert witnesses invites 
issues about the admissibi lity of their 
testimony. Although most jurisdictions 
follow some version of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, state couns and federal cir-
cuits failed to achieve any consensus on 
how the rules regulate the admissibility 
of expert evidence. The failure was all 
the more remarkable because the courts 
were by and large dealing with identi-
cally worded rules. 
Daniel Blinka, U. W. 1978, is an associate 
professor of law ?? Marquette University 
Law School where he teaches courses in 
evidence and crimina/law. He is the 
author of 8/inka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Evidence (West Publishing, 1991) (and 
supplementation). 
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Daubert,_ Merrell Dow 
Phar????????????changes 
the law of evidence In the 
Seventh Circuit 
and fosters a host of new 
questions In state courts. 
In 1984 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
resolved all uncertainties regarding the 
test governing the adm issibi li ty of expert 
evidence in Wisconsin. In State v. 
Walsta??2 the court confirmed that Wis-
consin adheres to a relevancy standard: if 
a properly qualified expert is able to offer 
testimony relevant and helpful to the is-
sues in the case, his or her testimony is 
admissible. Walstad further clarified that 
the so-called Frye test of general accep-
tance within the scientific community 
was not a prerequisite to admissibility, 
even though it remained a viable standard 
for the taking of judicial notice.3 
The certainty engendered by Walstad 
stood in marked contrast to the chaos in 
the federal court , where the circuits 
warred over the correct standard. A ma-
jority of the circuits, including the Sev-
enth Circuit, maintained that the Frye test 
survived the advent of the Federal Rules 
ofEvidence.4 Other circuits opted for the 
relevancy approach (like Wisconsin's) 
orthe somewhat more demanding" Down-
ing test," first articulated by the Third 
Circuit and representing a hybridization 
of the relevancy and general acceptance 
approaches.5 
On June 28, 1993, the U.S. Supreme 
Court finally entered the fray in Daubert. 
The Court quickly and efficiently as-
signed the Frye test to oblivion as the sole 
criterion of admissibility. Instead, it of-
fered a host of "general observations" 
that inevitably will lead to a reassessment 
of the general relevancy test set forth in 
Walstad. 
Daubert is significant for the Wi scon-
sin lawyer because it changed the law of 
evidence in the Seventh Circuit and will 
foster a myriad of new questions in state 
courts. This article reviews the Daubert 
decision and explains how it invites a 
reappraisal of Walstad. 
The Daubert case 
The plaintiffs in Daubert were two chil-
dren born with birth defects. The chil-
dren alleged that their injuries were caused 
by their mother's ingestion during preg-
nancy ofBendectin ??, an anti-nausea drug 
manufactured by the defendant, Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals. The defendant 
moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that there was insufficient proof 
that Bendectin was a teratogen (a sub-
stancecausingabnormalities). Both sides 
presented conflicting cientific evidence 
from experts bearing impressive creden-
tials. Plaintiffs' scientific evidence fea-
tured animal-cell studies, " live-animal 
studies" and the "reanalysis" of epide-
miological (statistical) data prepared in 
connection with other studies. 
The trial court granted the summary 
judgment motion. The district court ruled 
that the reanalysis evidence failed to meet 
the general acceptance (Frye) test and 
that the remaining scientific evidence 
was insufficient to raise a jury question 
on causation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision 
written by Justice' Blackrnun, reversed 
and ordered the matter remanded for fur-
ther proceedings. ChiefJustice Rehnquist, 
joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in 
part and dissented in part. 
The Court held unanimously that "the 
Frye test was superseded by the adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence."' The 
entire Court agreed that the "baseline" 
for admissibility is found in the relevancy 
rules of FRE 40 ?I and 402, which are 
identical to their Wisconsin counterparts. 
Moreover, the rules articulate a liberal 
standard of relevancy .7 The admissibility 
of scientific evidence is, however, also 
governed by FRE 702, which allows ex-
pert witnesses to testify about scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge 
that will assist the trier of fact in deter-
mining a fact in issue. Nothing in the 
language of FRE 702 or its drafting his-
tory suggested that the rule incorporated 
the Frye test. Although the Court unani-
mously agreed that Frye did not control 
the admissibility of scientific evidence 
under the federal rules, the justices parted 
company on the precise interplay of the 
rules. 
The Daubert criteria for 
admissibility 
The majority of the Court offered some 
general observati?n? on the admissibility 
of scientific evidence. These remarks, 
which comprise the bulk of Justice 
Blackmon's opinion, were addressed spe-
cifically to trial judges faced with the 
bewildering task of mediating conflicts 
between experts on highly specialized or 
abstruse subjects. 
The Court acknowledged the liberal 
orientation of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but cautioned that the rules st?p 
short of granting carte blanche to expert 
testimony. Specifically, trialjudges must 
screen expert testimony: "the trial judge 
must ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony or evidence admitted is not 
only relevant, but reliable."8 Rule 702 
"clearly contemplates some degree of 
regulation of the subject and theories 
about which an expert may testify. "9 
With pedantic precision, Justice 
Blackmun parsed the subtle meanings 
inherent in the phrase "scientific knowl-
edge." He explained that the reliability or 
trustworthiness of scientific knowledge 
depended upon the fealty of the theory or 
technique to the scientific method, which 
involves repeated testing and refinement 
as a way of establishing the validity of the 
procedure or idea. Moreover, Rule 702 
provides that expert evidence is admis-
sible only where it will assist the trier of 
i2 
fact. And in assessing the helpfulness of 
the evidence, the trial judge must deter-
mine the fit between the expert evidence 
and the facts of the case. 
In short, scientific validity ultimately 
turns on the purpose for which the evi-
dence is offered. Justice Blackrnun of-
fered as an example evidence concerning 
the phases of the moon. The existence of 
a full moon may help a jury decide how 
dark it was on a given night, but lunar 
phases have no bearing on a person's 
irrational behavior on that same evening. 
Without seeing any paradox in its as-
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?the majority of the Court cau-
tioned that expert testimony must be re-
stricted because of the wide latitude al-
lowed experts under the federal rules. 
Experts are freed from 'the traditional 
requirement that opinions be predicated 
upon first-hand knowledge. Unlike a lay 
witness, ari expert can predicate an opin-
ion on inadmissible hearsay under Rule 
703. Relaxation ofthefirst-hancl knowl-
edge rule is justified only where the 
expert's opinion has "a reliable basis in 
the knowledge and experience of his dis-
cipline."10 
Thus, the trial judge must make "a 
preliminary assessme?? of whether the 
reasoning or methode I ogy under! y i ng the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of 
whether that reasoning can be applied to 
the facts in issue." 11 The judge's determi-
nation is governed by Rule 104(a), mean-
ing that the rules of evidence generally 
are inapplicable to the issue of admissi-
bility and the judge must be convinced of 
the validity and fit of the proffered scien-
tific testimony by a preponderance of the 
evidence. To assist the trial judges in this' 
task, the Court offered a number of gen-
eral observations without presuming to 
set forth a definitive checklist or test. 
None of the factors outlined by the Court 
were extensively discussed or explained. 
First, a key question is whether the 
theory or technique has been tested. The 
Court referred to several authorities that 
discussed the importance of rigorously 
testing theories or techniques to deter-
mine whether they can be falsified. 12 
The second consideration is whether 
the theory or technique has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication. 
TheCourtexplained that publication was 
a relevant factor but the presence or ab-
sence of publication was not dispositive 
in assessing scientific validity. Justice 
Blackmun observed that some techniques 
or theories "are too particular, too new, or 
of too limited interest to be published," 
thus suggesting that the trial court should 
consider the reasons why there was no 
publication. 13 
Third, the trial court must consider the 
scientific technique's "known or poten-
tial rate of error ... and the existence and 
maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique's operation." The reference to 
standards would seem to refer to the 
existence of established protocols or pub-
lished methodologies. No indication was 
given of what, if any, statistical criteria 
establisheli an acceptable rate of error. 14 
Fourth, the general acceptance of a 
theory or technique is an important, al-
though not controlling, factor. Justice 
Blackmun observed: "Widespread ac-
ceptance can be an important factor in 
ruling particularevidence admissible, and 
'a known technique that has been able to 
attract only minimal support within the 
community' ... may properly be viewed 
with skepticism."???? 
In short, the Court demoted the Frye 
test in the evidentiary pantheon but it 
would be a mistake to dismiss the general 
acceptance test as dead or??o longer worth 
worrying about. 
Daubert's impact on Wisconsin 
Wisconsin's relevancy approach shares 
critical common ground with the Daubert 
approach. Both Walstad and Daubert 
agree that relevancy is the baseline of 
admissibility. Moreover, both cases re-
flect an abiding faith in the adversary 
system and the abilities of jurors. The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Walstad 
observed that the critical considerations 
for admissibility are the expert's qualifi-
cations and the relevancy of the testi-
mony; weaknesses in the expert's testi-
mony may be brought out on cross-ex-
amination or through impeachment. 
Echoing similar themes, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Daubert reaffirmed its 
belief that lay jurors, assisted by the ad-
versary system, would not be befuddled 
by ''absurd and irrational pseudoscientific 
assertions." In particular, Justice 
Blackmun noted that: "Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evi-
dence, and careful instruction on the bur-
den of proof arc the traditional and appro-
priate means of attacking shaky but ad-
missible evidence." 16 
Despite the existence of common 
ground, there are critical difference? be-
tween the Walstad relevancy approach 
and the Daubert approach. Daubert con-
templates a far ???? a?tive screening role 
for the trial judge than anything sug-
gested in Walstad. Although the two 
cases are not necessarily in cons is tent with 
one another, neither arc they identical: 
Daubert raises the level of scrutiny con-
templated by Walstad's relevancy test to 
the fifth power. In addition to the four 
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criteria 'discussed above, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Daubert also admonished 
trial judges to be mindful of other appli-
cable rules (all of which have nearly 
identical Wisconsin counterparts). 
Rule 703 allows experts to base opin-
ions on inadmissible evidence but only if 
?? is of a type that is reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the field in reaching 
such conclusions. Rule 706 also permits 
the courts to appoint their own experts. 
Finally, Rule 403 allows the trial judge to 
exclude relevant evidence where its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed 
by other considerations, such as confu-
sion of the issues or misleading the jury. 
The Court also suggested that Rule 403 
permits the trial judge rnore control over 
expert than lay witnesses because 
"?e]xpert evidence can be both powerful 
and quite misleading." 
Thus, Daubert portrays a more expan-
sive screening role for the trial judge than 
the bare determination of the witness's 
qualifications and the relevancy of his or 
her testimony as required by Walstad. 
Despite its paean to the liberal orientation 
of the federal rules, Daubert exudes con-
siderable skepticism about scientific theo-
ries and techniques that fall outside the 
mainstreams of the expe1ts' disciplines. 
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Daubert raises significant 
problems and questions 
The Walstad approach affords broad ad-
missibility of ex?ert evidence; it is ex-
ceptionally difficult to exclude proffered 
expert evidence under its mandate. And 
in that sense it affords Wisconsin lawyers 
some degree of certainty when preparing 
for trial. 
Daubert may pose more questions than 
it resolves. Although the Court expressed 
confidence that trial judges will be able to 
navigate the shoals and eddies of science, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent 
pointed out the vagaries inherent in the 
criteria posed by the majority, 17 Daubert 
is a vote of confidence for trial judges but 
leaves them with precious little instruc-
tion on how to decide in a particular case 
between contending scientists on some 
arcane point. Perhaps the key to Daubert 
is Justice Blackmun's understated re-
minder that the proponent of the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence carries the 
burden of proof. To put it another way, 
the proponent must convince the trial 
judge that it is more likely. than not that 
the evidence is reliable and fits the facts 
of the case. If the judge just does not 
know which expert to believe, the evi-
dence must be excluded because the pro-
ponent failed to meet the burden of proof. 
Equally troubling is that the Daubert 
criteria address only scientific knowl-
edge; the Court expressly declined to 
discuss how its analysis applied to the 
technical or other specialized knowledge 
that also is referred to in Rule 702. What 
is science? Is there a difference between 
science and the other areas of expertise 
mentioned in Rule 702? If so, how do we 
tell when an expert is a scientist or 
nonscientist? For example, is medicine a 
science, and if it is what are we to make 
of Wisconsin decisions that refer to it as 
being an art? 18 The prime virtue of 
Walstad is that it offers a test that applies 
across the boarJ to all species of experts. 
It does not force difficult, and probably 
futile, distinctions between science, tech-
nology and other specialized knowledge. 
Finally, one wonders whether Daubert 
is anything more in its effect than the 
Frye general acceptance standard by an-
other name. The general acceptance test 
may not have survived the federal rules as 
the sole criterion of admissibility, but it 
nevertheless continues to play a large 
role in Daubert. The Court explicitly 
stated that general acceptance remains as 
an important factor bearing on the trust-
wmthiness oftl1e scientific theory or tech-
nique. And the other three factors ad-
( continued on page 61) 
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E vidence (from page 1 3) 
vanced by the Court (albeit in a cursory 
fashion) all seem to bear on general ac-
ceptance as well: l ) has the technique or 
theory been tested; 2) has it been pub-
lished or otherwise subjected to peer re-
view; and 3) is there an established rate of 
error or standard of performance? In 
short, all three of the e criteria appear to 
be alternative ways of gauging general 
acceptance within a scienti fic commu-
nity: the Frye test. 
What happens now in 
Wisconsin? 
Daubert undoubtedly will spawn a reex-
amination of Walstad as lawyers contend 
that proffered expert evidence fai ls to 
meet the Daubert standard of admissibil-
ity. The argument will be that virtually 
all of the Federal Rules of Evidence dis-
cussed in Daubert are identical to their 
counterparts in the Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence. Such contentions may be fur-
thered by the observation that, in broad 
outline, Daubert is cons istent with 
Walstad, perhaps representing only a re-
fi nement of the relevancy approach. 
Wiscons in state courts are not, of 
course, obligated to adopt Daubert. Al-
though the corresponding state and fed-
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eral evidentiary rules are worded identi-
cally and arise from the same model, the 
interpretation of the Wisconsin Rules of 
Evidence remains a subject of state law. 
The Supremacy Clause of the federal 
constitution does not force Wisconsin to 
join the Daubert Court in lockstep. 
In all likelihood, Wisconsin will wit-
ness a period of uncertainty as the trial 
courtS and appellate courtS struggle to 
determine whether Walstad survives 
Daubert. Nor should the focus be kept on 
the state courts alone. Daubert poses so 
many potential ly troubling questions that 
it is likely that the U.S. Supreme Court 
may have to revisit the issue to provide 
some firmer guidance on such questions 
as the applicability of the Court's criteria 
to nonscientific evidence. 
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